Ç¥ÁØÈ­ Âü¿©¾È³»

TTAÀÇ Ç¥ÁØÇöȲ

Ȩ > Ç¥ÁØÈ­ °³¿ä > TTAÀÇ Ç¥ÁØÇöȲ

Ç¥ÁعøÈ£ TTAT.3G-33.810(R6-6.0.0) ±¸Ç¥ÁعøÈ£
Á¦°³Á¤ÀÏ 2003-10-30 ÃÑÆäÀÌÁö 26
ÇѱÛÇ¥Áظí IMT-2000 3GPP - ³×Æ®¿öÅ© ¿µ¿ª º¸¾È/ÀÎÁõ ÇÁ·¹ÀÓ¿öÅ© - NDS/IP ¹ßÀü¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿¬±¸(R6)
¿µ¹®Ç¥Áظí IMT-2000 3GPP - Network Domain Security/Authentication Framework(NDS/AF) - Feasibility study to support NDS/IP Evolution(R6)
Çѱ۳»¿ë¿ä¾à
¿µ¹®³»¿ë¿ä¾à The scope of this feasibility study is limited to authentication of network elements which are using NDS/IP, and located in the inter-operator domain.
It means that this study concentrates on authentication of Security Gateways (SEG), and the corresponding Za?interfaces. Authentication of elements in the intra-operator domain is considered as an internal issue for the operators. This is quite much in line with [6] which states that only Za is mandatory, and that the security domain operator can decide if the Zb-interface is deployed or not, as the Zb-interface is optional for implementation.
However, NDS/AF can easily be adapted to intra-operator use. This is just a simplification of the inter-operator case as all NDS/IP NEs and the PKI infrastructure belong to the same operator. Validity of certificates may be restricted to the operator's domain.
This work might also later be extended to provide entity authentication services to non-control plane nodes, but this has not been studie
±¹Á¦Ç¥ÁØ 3GPP TR 33.810-6.0.0
°ü·ÃÆÄÀÏ TTAT.3G-33.810(R6-6.0.0).zip TTAT.3G-33.810(R6-6.0.0).zip            

ÀÌÀü
IMT-2000 3GPP - ¸Á ½Äº° ¹× ½Ã°£´ë(NITZ) ; 1´Ü°è (R5)
´ÙÀ½
IMT-2000 3GPP - ÀÏ¹Ý ÆÐŶ ¹«¼±¼­ºñ½º (GPRS); ¼­ºñ½º ¼³¸í; 1´Ü°è (R5)